Bus stop, property price and land value tax: A multilevel hedonic analysis with quantile calibration by Wang, Y et al.
B
a
Y
a
b
c
d
a
A
R
R
A
K
L
T
B
P
I
o
L
w
u
i
t
T
E
p
w
a
C
e
s
o
R
h
0Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 381–391
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Land  Use  Policy
j o ur na l ho me page: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / landusepol
us  stop,  property  price  and  land  value  tax:  A  multilevel  hedonic
nalysis  with  quantile  calibration
iming  Wanga,∗,  Dimitris  Potogloub,c, Scott  Orfordb, Yi  Gongd
The Bartlett School of Construction and Project Management, The Bartlett Faculty of Built Environment, University College London, London WC1E 7HB, UK
School of Planning and Geography, Cardiff University, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3WA, UK
RAND Europe, Westbrook Centre, Milton Road, Cambridge CB4 1YG, UK
Sustainable Places Research Institute, Cardiff University, 33 Park Place, Cardiff CF10 3BA, UK
 r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 20 October 2013
eceived in revised form 30 May  2014
ccepted 26 July 2014
eywords:
and value tax
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Based  on  a  multilevel  and  quantile  hedonic  analysis  regarding  the local  public  bus system  and  the prices
of residential  properties  in  Cardiff,  Wales,  we  ﬁnd  strong  evidence  to support  two  research  hypotheses:
(a)  the  number  of bus  stops  within  walking  distance  (300–1500  m)  to  a property  is positively  associated
with  the  property’s  observed  sale  price,  and (b)  properties  of  higher  market  prices,  compared  with  their
cheaper  counterparts,  tend  to  beneﬁt  more  from  spatial  proximity  to the  bus  stop  locations.  Given these
statistical  ﬁndings,  we  argue  that,  land  value  tax  (LVT),  albeit  a classic  political  idea  dating  back  to the  earlyransport infrastructure
us stop
roperty price
20th century,  does  have  contemporary  relevance  and,  with modern  geographic  information  technologies,
can  be  rigorously  analysed  and  empirically  justiﬁed  with  a view  to  actual  implementation.  Levying  LVT
will not  only  generate  additional  ﬁscal  revenues  to help  ﬁnance  the development  and maintenance  of
local  public  infrastructures,  but will  also ensure  a  more  just  distribution  of the  economic  welfare  yielded
by public  investment.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY licensentroduction
In recent years, the United Kingdom (UK) has witnessed a revival
f public interests in land value tax (LVT).1 The original idea of
VT dates back to George (1879), an American political economist,
ho, partly inspired by Smith (1863), posits that the value of land,
ltimately, comes from the adjacent infrastructures and amenities
nvested by the whole community. Increments in land value due
o public investment, thus, ought to be re-captured through LVT.
he earliest political attempts to legislate LVT took place in the late
dwardian Britain (Short, 1997, Chapter 2). LVT was ofﬁcially pro-
osed in the 1909 ﬁnance bill (also known as “People’s Budget”),
hen David Lloyd George served as Chancellor of the Exchequer
s a member of the governing Liberal party. However, the then
onservatives-dominated House of Lords, though passing the gen-
ral budget in 1910, managed to veto the LVT proposal. A similar
tory happened later with the 1931 Finance Act, which contained
∗ Corresponding author. +44 02076791890.
E-mail address: yiming.wang@ucl.ac.uk (Y. Wang).
1 For the examples of Labour’s Land Value Campaign (http://www.labourland.
rg/) and the Liberal Democratic Party’s Action for Land Taxation and Economic
eform (http://libdemsalter.org.uk/).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.07.017
264-8377/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
a LVT initiative passed by the ruling Labour party but was rejected
again by the Tory government in 1934 (Wenzer, 2000). One of the
latest efforts to seek legislation of LVT was in 2012 by Carolyn Lucas,
a Green party member of the UK parliament (The UK Parliament,
2012).
Although LVT was never implemented in Britain, its traces can
be observed in many other places around the world, such as in the
cities of Pittsburgh and Harrisburg in the American State of Penn-
sylvania and a number of countries such as Australia, Denmark,
Estonia, Russia, and New Zealand (Andelson, 2000; Bourassa, 1990;
Dye and England, 2010; Wyatt, 1994). While the actual policy
practice varies among these international cases, LVT has been
increasingly justiﬁed as a way to ﬁnance the construction and
maintenance of public transport infrastructures. The basic rationale
remains quite the same as per George original (1879), that publicly
invested transport network can promote the values of nearby pri-
vately owned land plots, given their improved accessibility. From
a political economy perspective, this part of added land value, if
substantiated, becomes a kind of positive externalities which can
be offset or captured through LVT. Otherwise, general tax payers
(who generate government revenues) are essentially subsidising
landowners who “quietly” extract the values of public transport
infrastructures. Making this free-ride problem even more press-
ing is the undersupply and underfunding of public transport in the
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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resent-day UK, which has resulted in a series of social exclusion
ssues, faced typically by the lower income population who  have
ifﬁculties affording private transport (Lucas, 2006).
In this paper, we explore the viability of levying land value
ax to ﬁnance the maintenance and development of local public
ransport infrastructures within a contemporary UK context. Our
mpirical study focuses on the public bus system owned by Cardiff
ity council in south Wales, which saw a £0.6 million funding cut
n the ﬁnancial year of 2012, leading to a second increase in bus
ares since October 2011 (Wales Online, 2012). Employing a con-
entional ordinary least square (OLS) hedonic regression approach,
e ﬁrstly examine the relations between the sale prices of circa
0,000 residential properties across 12 electoral wards in central
ardiff from 2000 to 2009 (see Fig. 2), and the number of bus
tops within the radii of 300 m,  400 m,  500 m,  750 m,  1000 m and
500 m of each property, based on the 2007 National Public Trans-
ort Access Nodes (NaPTAN) dataset (Department for Transport,
007). We  then further reﬁne the OLS results, respectively, within a
ultilevel modelling (Jones and Bullen, 1994) and quantile regres-
ion framework (Koenker, 2005). Our multilevel analysis suggests
he OLS estimates to be unbiased with respect to the inﬂuence of
us stop locations on the implicit land values of nearby properties.
ikewise, our quantile bivariate post hoc tests conﬁrm the over-
ll robustness of the OLS outcomes. A policy implication of these
tatistical ﬁndings is to exercise a two-tier progressive local land
alue taxation scheme in helping Cardiff council ﬁnance the local
us system. Our estimation, based on the number of bus stops
ithin a 1500 m radius of every individual property included in
ur sample data, suggests that, for a property priced below circa
195,000, every additional bus stop contributes to a circa 0.11%
arginal increase in property price through land value betterment.
he corresponding ﬁgure is 0.22% for a property in the second tier
ith a market price above £195,000.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next
ection “Land value tax: from Edwardian to contemporary Britain”
eviews the literature on land value tax and the related planning
ractices, mainly within a UK context. This is followed by the design
f this research in “Research design” section, which studies the case
f Cardiff Bus, by following an OLS and multilevel hedonic regres-
ion approach supplemented by a quantile calibration. The data and
odel results are reported in sections “The case of Cardiff bus” and
Model results”, respectively, before the study’s policy implications
re discussed in “Policy implications” section. The conclusions are
ummarised in “Conclusion and future research” section, alongside
he directions of future research.
and value tax: from Edwardian to contemporary Britain
he Edwardians
The latest global economic recession has forced many countries
o cut public spending. This is particularly the case in the UK, with
he coalition government aiming to reduce public expenditure by
s much as £6.2 billion between 2010 and 2011 (Her Majesty’s
reasury, 2010). Since budgetary stringency continued into 2012
nd 2013, public ﬁnance has become a top challenge confronting
he Westminster parliament, which is seeking new sources of tax
ncome, for example, by proposing a further rise in value-added
onsumption tax (VAT) from 20% to 25% (The Telegraph, 2012).
A century ago, the Edwardian politicians were similarly faced
ith a public ﬁnance challenge to fund the emerging welfare state
rogrammes, including an embryonic pension scheme (Hattersley,
004). David Lloyd George, during his Chancellorship of the Exche-
uer as a member of the governing Liberal party, proposed to
ax on tobaccos, luxurious goods, and most important of all,cy 42 (2015) 381–391
land, in the 1909 ﬁnance bill. These taxation measures were not
only intended to balance the government budget, but also to
tackle widespread political and economic inequalities faced by
the British society. Given its populist ﬂavour, the 1909 budget
was often called People’s Budget (Short, 1997). However, the then
Conservatives-dominated House of Lords, though reluctantly pass-
ing many initiatives included in People’s Budget one year later in
1910, managed to veto the land value tax (LVT) proposal.
The original idea of LVT actually came from the other side of the
Atlantic. George (1879), an American political economist born in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, once wrote:
“The tax upon land values is, therefore, the most just and equal
of all taxes. It falls only upon those who  receive from society a
peculiar and valuable beneﬁt, and upon them in proportion to
the beneﬁt they receive. It is the taking by the community, for
the use of the community, of that value which is the creation of
the community.” (George, 1879, Chapter 33)
George’s central tenet is that the value of land, ultimately, comes
from the adjacent infrastructures and amenities invested by the
local community. Increments in land value due to public invest-
ment therefore ought to be re-captured through LVT. This argument
resonates with the ground rent theories by Smith (1863), Ricardo
(1891), and even Marx (1867). The tax on land value can also be
considered a kind of Pigovian (1920) tax, if one sees the added land
value accruing from the positive externalities yielded by commu-
nity investment (Petrella, 1988).
The Contemporaries
The Pigovian aspect of LVT is perhaps best featured in its con-
temporary practice, as LVT has been more and more exercised
as a way  to support the ﬁnancing of public transport infras-
tructures (Ryan, 1999; Rybeck, 2004; Smith and Gihring, 2006;
Al-Mosaind et al., 1993; Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt, 1997; Bowes and
Ihlanfeldt, 2001; Debrezion et al., 2007, 2011; Hess and Almeida,
2007). Underpinning this policy practice is a theoretical conjec-
ture that publicly invested transport facilities adds signiﬁcant
values to the nearby privately owned land plots by improving
their spatial accessibilities to the transport network. This kind of
public-investment-triggered private land value betterment is a typ-
ical instance of positive externalities that could be offset through
proper government intervention (Pigou, 1920).
Nonetheless, land value taxation remains unimplemented
within the UK, even though some closely associated ﬁscal interven-
tions do exist in the British town planning practice. For example,
section (106) of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act allows
local planning authorities to charge developers, on a case-by-
case basis and often by negotiation, a so-called section (106)
payment to compensate for the potential negative externalities
(e.g., congestion and crowdedness) of new development on the
local community (The UK Parliament, 1990). Later, the Barker
Review of Land Use Planning (2006) was largely critical of sec-
tion (106) for its vagueness in concept and inconsistencies in
practice. The community Infrastructure levy (CIL) was introduced
in the 2008 Planning Act to partially replace section (106) (The UK
Parliament, 2008).
Like land value tax, section (106) and CIL are both public ﬁnan-
cial measures intended for externalities, hence Pigovian by nature.
However, LVT differs from section (106) and CIL in being a bet-
terment tax, which tries to capture the positive externalities of
community investment in local public infrastructures (Lee et al.,
2013). By comparison, the two types of planning charges are
employed to compensate for the potential negative externalities
of new property developments with respect to the local housing
and infrastructure capacities. They are thus essentially the same
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hing as what is called “impact fee” in the US (see, e.g., Ihlanfeldt
nd Shaughnessy, 2004).
Given the subtle and yet important difference between LVT and
lanning charges, it perhaps makes more sense to look at LVT in ref-
rence to the existing UK taxation system.2 For example, Maxwell
nd Vigor (2005) suggest substituting LVT for council tax and the
tamp duty. They argue that LVT is a levy on land, while both
he stamp duty and council tax are estimated by property value
nd are a property tax. Taxing on property instead of land value
nvolves disincentives for homeowners to maintain and improve
heir housing conditions – the more they invest in maintenance and
enovation, the more property tax liable. This perspective resonates
losely with Bourassa’s (1990, 1992) earlier empirical studies about
 similar topic within the US context, which identiﬁed a signiﬁcant
ncentive effect of LVT vis-à-vis property taxation.
esearch design
esearch question
Levying land-value tax involves both substantial political as well
s technical complexities and constitutes a radical reform to the
xisting UK public ﬁnance regime. Our research focuses more on the
mpirical and technical aspects of the issue, aiming to explore the
ays to assess local public infrastructures’ potential contribution
o the adjacent land values and to address the according policy
mplications.
While the word “infrastructure” connotes a variety of facili-
ies (usually of physical presence), this paper concentrates on the
elationship between land values and public transport infrastruc-
ure in the UK. This is because of the general consensus nowadays
egarding the ubiquitous and intimate interactions between trans-
ort and land use activities (Geurs and van Wee, 2004). Another
eason is that land value taxation, in recent decades, has been
ncreasingly rationalised as a value capture mechanism to ﬁnance
he development and maintenance of public transport facilities.
ast, given the current economic climate, public transport infras-
ructures in the UK are typically short of funding and thus in need
f strengthened ﬁscal support (Lucas, 2006).
Our speciﬁc research question centres on how to assess the spa-
ial relationships between the local public transport infrastructures
nd the land values of nearby residential properties. A concep-
ual issue is that housing sub-markets are a salient feature of
he British local real estate sector (Orford, 2000). A correspond-
ng methodological framework needs to be in place to capture the
atent heterogeneities with regard to the characteristics of differ-
nt neighbourhood environments, divergent property price levels,
nd the varying relations between their implicit land values and
he nearness to public transport locations.
 hedonic approach
Given our research question, we employ a hedonic regres-
ion approach as the basic modelling method in this study. While
osen’s (1974) seminal theoretical paper recommended a two-
tage regression procedure, for this policy-oriented paper, we adopt
 reduced-form version of the Rosen original and, as shown in Eq.
1), assume a linear semi-log function form in the ﬁrst stage of
edonic regression, which allows us to simplify the second stage by
irectly valuing the bus stop locations based on the corresponding
2 Actually, land value tax (LVT) is also often called single tax, because according
o  Henry George, the collection of LVT should replace any other taxation schemes,
uch as those on incomes and consumptions.cy 42 (2015) 381–391 383
coefﬁcient estimates (see a similar application, for example, by
Heikkila et al. (1989), p. 223):
log(p) = F(H, Y, W,  L, ε) (1)
where p denotes the property’s sale price, of which the natural log
is a function of H, Y, W and L, plus an error term, ε. H stands for a
set of hedonic control variables, each of which corresponds to an
attribute of the observed property, in terms of whether it is freehold
(r), newly built (n), detached (d), semi-detached (s), or terraced (t),
ﬂoor area (f), and how far the property is located from the central
business district (z). H may  be speciﬁed as Eq. (2):
H = {r, n, d, s, t, f, z} (2)
Y represents another set of dummy-coded variables capturing
the year in which an observed sale transaction took place. This is
intended to adjust for temporal effects, such as short term property-
price inﬂation in the local market, with X denoting the total number
of years under observation. If the ﬁrst year is noted as year 0, we
have Eq. (3):
Y = {Yu|u = 0, 1, 2, . . .,  X − 1} (3)
W consists of a series of dummy-coded variables, each indicat-
ing a local jurisdiction within which a property is located. These
variables capture average local environmental effects related to
educational and recreational amenities as well as the overall rep-
utation of the area. Assuming a total of M jurisdictions within the
study area, one of which is denoted as a reference jurisdiction, W0,
we may  deﬁne W as follows:
W = {Wv|v = 0, 1, 2, . . .,  M − 1} (4)
It should be noted that the model speciﬁcation as per Eqs. (4) and
(5) may  be considered following a ‘discrete-space expansion’ pro-
cess (Jones and Bullen, 1994, p. 254), whereby the constant term of
a regression equation is expanded into the (X − 1) + (M − 1) dummy
variables.
L = {ı} (5)
L in Eq. (5) represents a set of target variables, which relate directly
to the location of land beneath a property. These variables are
supposed to measure spatial accessibility and proximity to pub-
lic transport infrastructure. We  assume in this paper that L consists
of only one element ı. ı in Eq. (5) measures the aggregate number
of public transport nodes (e.g., train stations, bus stops, airport ter-
minals) within a buffer or catchment area of an observed property
location.3
Finally, a couple of standard econometric assumptions are asso-
ciated with the error term, ε. First, we  assume independence or
zero autocorrelation in the observed values of ε. Nevertheless, data
collected in the real world are likely to suffer from spatial as well
as temporal autocorrelation, depending on how the collection is
conducted. Second, we assume a single constant variance in the
error term or non-heteroskedasticity. However, this assumption is
also subject to post hoc test, given that housing sub-markets are anthe possibility of spatial heterogeneity in implicit prices between
sub-markets.
3 It needs to be acknowledged that recent years have seen some highly sophis-
ticated accessibility measures (e.g., Ferrari et al., 2012). While these innovative
measures are not the central topic of this paper, they can be very useful for future
research.
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ulti-level modelling
Multilevel modelling may  be seen as a generalised version of lin-
ar regression (Duncan et al., 1998). A multilevel modelling analysis
ombines both individual and contextual parameters, such as the
eographical jurisdiction (e.g., electoral wards) in which a property
s located and the years when a property is transacted. Multilevel
odels are intended to assess the correlation between observa-
ions within the same level of analysis and attempt to capture
hese variations by allowing the regression intercept to vary across,
or example, the jurisdictions and the years of sale. This approach
s known as a “random intercept” multi-level modelling method
Jones and Bullen, 1994).
0,v,u = ˇ0 + v + ˚v,u (6)
0 in Eq. (6) is the average intercept for all of the observed prop-
rties across different jurisdictions and sold in different years.  v
nd ˚v,u are two  independent error components:  v measures the
xtent to which the regression intercept for observations within
 given jurisdiction, Wv (v = 0, 1, 2,. . .,  M − 1), deviates from the
verall averaged constant term, ˇ0. Likewise, ˚v,u measures the
ifference between ˇ0 and the intercept for observations, not only
ithin Wv, but also sold in a given year, Yu (u = 0, 1, 2,. . .,  X − 1).
We deploy this multilevel speciﬁcation to capture both spatial
nd temporal land value variations, as per Fig. 1. In Fig. 1(a), the data
re grouped geographically in the up most level by electoral ward
our proxy for housing sub-markets), hoped to address potential
ssues of spatial autocorrelation and heterogeneity. The different
ears of house sales are then deﬁned as the second level of analysis,
n view of dealing with potential temporal autocorrelation. Fig. 1(b)
resents an alternative panel structure, where ward remains the
rst level of analysis and each individual property is now situated
t the next stage. However, the year of sale for every property is
urther deﬁned as a tertiary level. This alternative hierarchy is rele-
ant when a dataset contains many properties that have been sold
ultiple times during the period of observation.
uantile calibration
The method of quantile regression is ﬁrstly introduced by
oenker and Bassett (1978). Quantile regression essentially esti-
ates multiple quantiles (e.g. 10%, 50% or 75%) in the dependent
ariable’s conditional distribution. As a result, the approach tends
o generate more robust coefﬁcient estimates and provide more
omprehensive information about the distribution of the response
ariable than conventional regression towards the mean (Koenker,
005).
In the case of this paper, we are concerned with the substan-
ial price differentiation featuring many UK local property markets
Orford, 2000). We  hypothesise that properties at the high end
f a local real estate market may  exhibit systematically different
ransport-land relations than those at the lower end. In econo-
etric terms, this leads to non-constant conditional variance in
og(p) (i.e., the natural log of property price), hence a violation of
he homoscedasticity assumption. To adjust for the heterogeneous
elations between property price and the number of nearby public
ransport facilities, we apply a bivariate quantile regression method
n our post hoc robustness test:
og (p)iq = G(ı, ε) (7)
here i (i = 1, 2,. . .,  q) stands for the ith quantile in the conditional
istribution of log(p), if the distribution is divided into a total of q
qual intervals.
For demonstration purposes, assume K (log(p)) as the kernel
ensity function of log(p). One shall see that the quantile estimationcy 42 (2015) 381–391
is different from the conventional mean estimation. Specially, to
estimate the mean or expected value of log(p), we  have
E(log(p)) =
∫ log (p)max
log (p)min
log(p) × K(log(p))d log(p) (8)
The quantile estimation is however different by solving the
below equation in reference to log (p)iq:
∫ log (p)iq
log (p)min
K(log(p))d log(p) = i
q
(9)
A quantile coefﬁcient, given a linear function form, can be
worked out through linear programming (Koenker and Hallock,
2001). Acquiring a large number of quantile coefﬁcients in this
way enables us to conduct bootstrapping re-sampling and generate
an asymptotic kernel density distribution such as K(log(p)), allow-
ing an assessment of the asymptotic standard error and conﬁdence
interval for every quantile coefﬁcient (Machado and Mata, 2005).
The case of Cardiff bus
The local background
The Welsh Capital city of Cardiff is our study site, because the city
exempliﬁes an array of UK-wide issues with regard to the ﬁnancing
of local public transport. Public services in the UK have experienced
widespread funding cuts and austerity measures since 2008. Local
public transport is one of the severely affected sectors. For example,
in Cardiff, the local council-owned Cardiff bus system witnessed a
£0.6 million funding cut by the Welsh Government in 2012, leading
to a second increase in bus fare since October 2011 (Wales Online,
2012).
As elsewhere, lack of funding for public transport implicates a
number of potential issues in Cardiff. Inﬂated bus fare, for exam-
ple, is likely to discourage environment-friendly travel behaviour
and push people back into their cars (Newman and Kenworthy,
1999). International experience also shows that restricted public
transport tends to make commuting cost particularly unaffordable
for the lower income population, exacerbating the “spatial mis-
match” between where they live and where they can ﬁnd jobs
(Kain, 1992). Business opportunities can also be affected if they
become less accessible due to a shrinking supply of public trans-
port facilities. All of these issues, among many others, alert us
to the challenge of ﬁnancing public transport in a dire economic
climate.
Levying land value capture property tax appears to be a prom-
ising solution. In the case of Cardiff Bus, a single fare of £1.70 only
accounts for the value of bus service to a passenger, while a property
owner who  lives adjacent to the Cardiff bus network does not nec-
essarily pay the bus fare insofar as not using the service. However,
from a George (1879) perspective, the Cardiff Bus network may
have promoted the accessibility of its nearby real estate properties,
hence contributing to an appreciation of each property’s value by
a measurable percentage. If this research hypothesis can be sub-
stantiated and evidenced, a land value capture taxation scheme
becomes justiﬁable.
The data
The dataset used in this study contains observed property prices
and bus stop locations mainly within central Cardiff between 2000
and 2009 (see Fig. 2). Our study area covers 12 local electoral wards.
The area contains typical Victorian and Edwardian terraced houses,
ﬂats in converted buildings and suburban style semi-detached and
detached houses, alongside a small number of bungalows and
Y. Wang et al. / Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 381–391 385
Fig. 1. Cross-sectional (a) vs multilevel panel; (b) structures for property data analysis.
Notes: adapted from Duncan et al. (1998).
Table 1
Deﬁnition of variables and descriptive statistics.
Continuous variables Deﬁnition Mean St.dev.
p Property sale price in British pound sterling (£) 143922 87264
log(p)  Natural logarithm of price of the property when sold 11.725 0.5
ı300 m Number of bus-stops within 300 metres (m)  off the property 7.4 3.7
ı400 m Number of bus-stops within 400 metres (m)  off the property 13.3 5.3
ı500 m Number of bus-stops within 500 metres (m)  off the property 20.7 7.4
ı750 m Number of bus-stops within 750 metres (m) off the property 45.2 14.8
ı1000 m Number of bus-stops within 1000 metres (m)  off the property 77.7 24.4
ı1500 m Number of bus-stops within 1500 metres (m) off the property 167.7 57.5
F  Floor area of a property in square metres (m2) 105.2 48.9
Z  Distance to the central business district in metres (m) 3225.3 1408.7
Categorical variables Deﬁnition Proportion
r 1 if property is on freehold tenure, 0 otherwise 89.7%
n  1, if property is newly built when sold, 0 otherwise 3.8%
Property type
Flat as a the reference category 4.1%
d  1, if property is a detached house, 0 otherwise 12.0%
s  1, if property is a semi-detached house, 0 otherwise 25.6%
t  1, if property is a terraced house, 0 otherwise 58.3%
Year
Y0 1, if property was sold in 2000, 0 otherwise (reference category) 11.2%
Y1 1, if property was sold in 2001, 0 otherwise 13.4%
Y2 1, if property was sold in 2002, 0 otherwise 14.5%
Y3 1, if property was sold in 2003, 0 otherwise 12.6%
Y4 1, if property was sold in 2004, 0 otherwise 12.3%
Y5 1, if property was sold in 2005, 0 otherwise 9.6%
Y6 1, if property was sold in 2006, 0 otherwise 12.9%
Y7 1, if property was sold in 2007, 0 otherwise 12.4%
Y8 1, if property was sold in 2008, 0 otherwise 1.1%
Ward
W0 1, if a property is located in Cyncoed (reference category) 11.5%
W1 1, if property is located in Adamsdown or Butetown, 0 otherwise 12.1%
W2 1, if property is located in Cathays, 0 otherwise 2.4%
W3 1, if property is located in Heath, 0 otherwise 1.6%
W4 1, if property is located in Llanishen, 0 otherwise 1.3%
W5 1, if property is located in Splott or Rumney, 0 otherwise 23.1%
W6 1, if property is located in Penylan, 0 otherwise 15.0%
W7 1, if property is located in Pentwyn, 0 otherwise 17.6%
W8 1, if property is located in Plasnewydd, 0 otherwise 13.9%
W9 1, if property is located in Pontprennau, 0 otherwise 1.5%
386 Y. Wang et al. / Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 381–391
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Table 3
Results of ordinary least squares, log(p) as dependent variable.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Within 300 m Within 400 m Within 500 m Within 750 m Within 1000 m Within 1500 m
ˇ s.e. ˇ s.e. ˇ s.e. ˇ s.e. ˇ s.e. ˇ s.e.
Constant 10.506*** 0.025 10.479*** 0.027 10.438*** 0.028 10.417*** 0.034 10.343*** 0.039 10.269*** 0.048
Freehold (r) 0.120*** 0.009 0.121*** 0.009 0.123*** 0.009 0.126*** 0.009 0.127*** 0.009 0.125*** 0.009
New-built (n) 0.228*** 0.013 0.230*** 0.013 0.232*** 0.013 0.230*** 0.013 0.237*** 0.013 0.217*** 0.013
Detached (d) 0.651*** 0.016 0.654*** 0.016 0.654*** 0.016 0.647*** 0.016 0.644*** 0.016 0.645*** 0.016
Semi-detached (s) 0.468*** 0.014 0.471*** 0.014 0.469*** 0.014 0.465*** 0.014 0.464*** 0.014 0.465*** 0.015
Terraced (t) 0.360*** 0.014 0.361*** 0.014 0.359*** 0.014 0.356*** 0.014 0.354*** 0.014 0.357*** 0.014
Floor  area (f) 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000
Distance to CBD (z) 0.035*** 0.004 0.038*** 0.004 0.042*** 0.004 0.046*** 0.005 0.055*** 0.005 0.066*** 0.007
Sale  in 2001 (Y1) 0.112*** 0.009 0.110*** 0.009 0.111*** 0.009 0.112*** 0.009 0.113*** 0.009 0.110*** 0.009
Sale  in 2002 (Y2) 0.301*** 0.009 0.297*** 0.009 0.297*** 0.009 0.297*** 0.009 0.299*** 0.009 0.295*** 0.009
Sale  in 2003 (Y3) 0.526*** 0.009 0.522*** 0.009 0.524*** 0.009 0.525*** 0.009 0.522*** 0.009 0.520*** 0.009
Sale  in 2004 (Y4) 0.694*** 0.009 0.693*** 0.009 0.693*** 0.009 0.694*** 0.009 0.693*** 0.009 0.691*** 0.009
Sale  in 2005 (Y5) 0.781*** 0.010 0.778*** 0.010 0.776*** 0.009 0.778*** 0.009 0.777*** 0.009 0.776*** 0.010
Sale  in 2006 (Y6) 0.791*** 0.009 0.789*** 0.009 0.789*** 0.009 0.791*** 0.009 0.791*** 0.009 0.789*** 0.009
Sale  in 2007 (Y7) 0.842*** 0.009 0.840*** 0.009 0.840*** 0.009 0.841*** 0.009 0.840*** 0.009 0.839*** 0.009
Sale  in 2008 (Y8) 0.858*** 0.023 0.857*** 0.023 0.861*** 0.022 0.860*** 0.022 0.861*** 0.022 0.861*** 0.022
Adamstown (W1) −0.512*** 0.014 −0.508*** 0.014 −0.502*** 0.014 −0.499*** 0.014 −0.488*** 0.014 −0.465*** 0.015
Splott  (W2) −0.513*** 0.012 −0.507*** 0.012 −0.493*** 0.012 −0.486*** 0.013 −0.464*** 0.014 −0.430*** 0.017
Cathays (W3) −0.196*** 0.020 −0.194*** 0.020 −0.186*** 0.020 −0.182*** 0.020 −0.164*** 0.020 −0.152*** 0.021
Heath  (W4) −0.142*** 0.019 −0.137*** 0.019 −0.139*** 0.019 −0.143*** 0.019 −0.146*** 0.019 −0.144*** 0.019
Llanishen (W5) −0.240*** 0.024 −0.250*** 0.024 −0.257*** 0.024 −0.262*** 0.025 −0.269*** 0.025 −0.276*** 0.025
Penylan (W6) −0.064*** 0.011 −0.064*** 0.011 −0.062*** 0.011 −0.051*** 0.011 −0.039*** 0.011 −0.018 0.013
Pentwyn (W7) −0.648*** 0.010 −0.647*** 0.010 −0.643*** 0.010 −0.644*** 0.010 −0.638*** 0.010 −0.638*** 0.010
Plasnewydd (W8) −0.235*** 0.014 −0.230*** 0.014 −0.225*** 0.014 −0.229*** 0.014 −0.229*** 0.014 −0.218*** 0.014
Pontprennau (W9) −0.500*** 0.020 −0.502*** 0.020 −0.502*** 0.020 −0.506*** 0.020 −0.508*** 0.020 −0.505*** 0.020
Number of bus stops (ı) 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
Sample size 9655 9650 9656 9653 9659 9669
R2 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.851 0.850 0.849
F-test  (df) 2176 (25) 2179 (25) 2185 (25) 2195 (25) 2186 (25) 2167 (25)
p-Value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.001.
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Table 4
Testing autocorrelation and homoscedasticity in OLS results.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Within 300 m Within 400 m Within 500 m Within 750 m Within 1000 m Within 1500 m
Independence of ε
Durbin–Watson 1.773 1.777 1.779 1.779 1.779 1.776
p-Value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Spatial  autocorrelation
Moran’s I 0.150 0.150 0.149 0.149 0.150 0.149
Expected −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
Standard deviation 0.0004 0.0004 −0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
reusch
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NaPTAN-v2.2) dataset (Department for Transport, 2007). These
re also shown in Fig. 2. The number of bus stops within speciﬁed
adii of each property (i.e., 300 m,  400 m,  500 m,  750 m,  1000 m,  and
500 m)  was calculated using ArcGIS. Table 1 presents a summary
f the variables included in the sample of properties in the dataset.
able 2 also shows that this is broadly a cross-sectional rather than
anel dataset, as more than 75% of the properties have only been
old once during the 9-year period.
odel results4
LS results
Table 3 presents the results of six ordinary least square (OLS)
egressions based on the conventional hedonic approach pre-
cribed in “A Hedonic Approach” section. The dependent variable
n every regression is the natural logarithm of price (log(p)) and all
f the six models attempt to capture the effect of Cardiff Bus on
and value via ı, which measures the number of bus stops within
ifferent walkable radii (i.e., 300 m,  400 m,  500 m,  750 m,  1000 m,
nd 1500 m)  around each property contained in the dataset. Fol-
owing Belsley et al. (1980) a variety of regression diagnostic tests
ere performed on the OLS models in order to check whether any
f the regression assumptions had been violated. These included
dentifying outliers that may  have a disproportionate inﬂuence on
he models, and removing the corresponding observations if neces-
ary; checking for serious multi-collinearity in the models; testing
he normality of the error term; and checking for heteroscedasticity
nd autocorrelation in the error term. The latter tests are discussed
n more detail in a later section.
Model 1, for example, includes the explanatory variable with
egard to the number of bus stops within 300 m around each prop-
rty. The estimated parameter corresponding to this variable shows
hat the effect of Cardiff Bus on property price or, more accu-
ately, on land value as reﬂected in property price, is positive
nd statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. In other
ords, the more bus stops there are around a property, the higher
he value of land beneath that property. Similar ﬁndings are also
iscernible from the other regressions estimating the effect of num-
er of bus stops within 400 m,  500, 750 m,  1000 m and 1500 m,
espectively.
By back transforming the magnitude of the estimated coefﬁ-
ient with regard to the number of bus stops within 300 m,  we
an calculate the marginal increase in land value as a result of pla-
ing every extra bus stop around a property. In percentage, this
4 OLS results are estimated in IBM SPSS Statistics 20, while the multi-level analysis
s  conducted with MLWin  v.3.20 (Rasbash et al., 2012). The quantile regression is
xercised using an R/SPSS interface based on the original “quantreg” R codes by
oenker (2007). and Pagan (1979) test
1) 0.887(1) 1.503(1) 0.612(1)
 0.3461 0.2202 0.4341
added land value equals to (e0.003 − 1) × 100 ≈ 0.3%. Examination of
the coefﬁcients of the number of bus-stops within different buffer
zones around property in Table 3 suggests that the effect of bus
stops within distance is relatively stable and statistically signiﬁ-
cant. The land value beneﬁt of every additional bus stop within a
circular catchment area larger than 500 m by radius is about 0.1%
of the corresponding property price. The ﬁgure rises to 0.3% if the
size of catchment shrinks to 500 m or less by radius. Overall, all
models show that the availability of public transport infrastructure
can signiﬁcantly promote land value and thereby raise property
price.
The coefﬁcient of z, the distance to Cardiff’s central business
district (CBD), is also positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Accord-
ing to some studies, this ﬁnding is counter-intuitive and against
the conventional wisdom about urban spatial structure. Per clas-
sic urban economic theory (e.g., Anas et al., 1998), property prices
should decline alongside increase in the properties’ distance to city
centre. However, previous studies have also provided several expla-
nations for the positive inﬂuence of distance to CBD on property
price. For example, the assumption of a declining land value as
distance increases from CBD is based on the adoption of a mono-
centric location choice model (Dubin and Sung, 1987), while Cardiff
appears to be a rather polycentric city.
Floor area is also a positive and statistically signiﬁcant factor in
terms of its impact on property price. The effect of ﬂoor space is
consistent across all six models presented in Table 3. Following a
back transformation of the parameter with respect to ﬂoor space,
we ﬁnd that every additional square metre in a property increases
its value by (e0.004 − 1) × 100 ≈ 0.4%.
We capture mean spatial variation in property price by using a
series of dummy-coded variables representing the wards in which
each property is located. The ward named Cyncoed is used as the
reference category as it is the area with the highest average prop-
erty price in the data set. All models show a signiﬁcant difference in
property price from Cyncoed, although the last regression (model
6 in Table 3) indicates no signiﬁcant difference in property price
between Cyncoed and Penylan.
All other coefﬁcients have the expected signs and agree with
conventional ﬁndings in the hedonic literature (Edmonds, 1984).
For example, a property under a freehold tenure is likely to show a
higher price compared with a leasehold property. Similarly, a newly
built property tends to have more market value than an aged prop-
erty. Detached properties exhibit the highest prices, followed by
semi-detached properties and ﬂats, of which the latter is deﬁned
as the reference property type in this analysis. Finally, the dummy
variables with regard to price differences due to the calendar year
when a property was sold are all signiﬁcantly different from zero.
The year of 2000 is used as the reference year, while the remaining
coefﬁcients indicate a constant increase in property price over time,
partly due to inﬂation in pound sterling and partly due to dynamics
in the local housing market.
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ultilevel results
As mentioned earlier, ordinary least square (OLS) regression
ay  involve potential issues related to spatial and temporal auto-
orrelations. In terms of spatial autocorrelation, the prices of
roperties within a same jurisdiction (i.e., electoral wards in our
ata) are likely to be more similar than those outside. In terms of
emporal autocorrelation, properties sold within the same year may
how a convergence in sale price vis-à-vis those transacted within
 different year. To account for both the geographic as well as tem-
oral autocorrelations, our OLS models would have to be expanded
xtensively to accommodate (M − 1) × (X − 1) interaction factors. In
ontrast, multilevel modelling analysis appears to be a more efﬁ-
ient alternative to address the issue of autocorrelation (Jones and
ullen, 1994).
Table 4 identiﬁes a problem of autocorrelation underlying all
he six OLS models. The Durbin–Watson test suggests an overall
igniﬁcant serial interdependence of the error terms (ε) in every
LS model. Because the Durbin–Watson result is more sensitive
o temporal autocorrelation, we further exercise a Moran’s I test
Anselin, 1988), of which the estimates also conﬁrm a presence of
 signiﬁcant albeit weak spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I ≈ 0.15).
owever, the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test for the whole model
uggests that heteroscedasticity is not a problem in the error terms
nd they have constant variance. To address the autocorrelation
roblem, six multilevel regressions (models 7–12) are further con-
ucted. Since over 75% of the sampled properties are sold only once
etween 2000 and 2009, we estimate the multilevel models in ref-
rence to the cross-sectional hierarchy shown in Fig. 1(a) instead
f the panel structure as per Fig. 1(b).
Table 5 illustrates the results of our multilevel modelling anal-
sis. Both the ward-by-ward (2
ward
) and year-to-year variance
2year) are statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the OLS ﬁnding that
here are generalisable differences across wards and years in terms
f property price. Around 19% of the aggregate variance in property
rice (2property) can be attributed to 
2
ward
, compared with around
6% to 2year . Nevertheless, ı, which measures the impact of bus
tops on nearby land value, remains stable and is thus unbiased.
his essentially conﬁrms the robustness of the OLS estimates, even
n face of the identiﬁed spatial and temporal autocorrelations.
uantile results
Table 6 reports the results of our quantile bivariate regressions.
s noted above, we conduct this quantile analysis mainly as a post
oc calibration of the OLS estimates, in case price-based hetero-
eneities lead to a biased coefﬁcient measure of ı. We  thus use
og(p) as the dependent variable and ı as the only independent
ariable to gauge the number of bus stops within different walkable
istances, from 300 m to 1500 m,  around every observed property
ocation.
Generally speaking, Table 6 indicates relatively weak and/or
nsigniﬁcant associations between the number of bus stops and
roperty prices at the 10% and 20% quantiles, where the observed
roperty prices are below £74,000 in the dataset. In contrast, the
trongest and most signiﬁcant correlations can be found for proper-
ies at the 80% quantile, priced around £195,000. Those even more
xpensive properties at the 90% quantile (i.e., £250.000), however,
eem to beneﬁt no more from the number of nearby bus stops than
hose at the 80% quantile, even though they tend to be better off
ompared with all properties below the 80% quantile, especially
hen we increase the search radius to more than 750 m.
While conﬁrming the overall robustness of OLS estimates with
egard to the mean of ı, the results of our quantile analysis do sug-
est ı to be systematically volatile across different price segments. Ta
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Table 6
Results of quantile bivariate regressions, log(p) as dependent variable and ı as independent variable.
Quantile ı300 m ı400 m ı500 m ı750 m ı1000 m ı750 m
 ˇ s.e.  ˇ s.e.  ˇ s.e.  ˇ s.e.  ˇ s.e.  ˇ s.e.
10% −0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.007*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
20%  0.004 0.003 0.003* 0.002 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
30%  0.011*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
40% 0.013*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
50%  0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
60%  0.010*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
70%  0.013*** 0.002 0.013*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
80%  0.020*** 0.002 0.020*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
90%  0.011*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
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* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.001.
Speciﬁcally, spatial proximity to Cardiff Bus stops tends to ben-
ﬁt properties at the high end of the local real estate market. The
trongest positive externalities can be observed in properties above
he 80% price quantile, with every additional bus stop within a
500 m buffer zone, for example, contributing to an increase by
bout 0.22% in property sale price through land value betterment.
he corresponding ﬁgure for the cheaper properties is halved to
round 0.11%.
olicy implications
The results of our regression analysis based on empirical data
rom Cardiff have some important policy implications. First and
oremost, the outcomes of our ordinary least square regression and
ultilevel modelling analysis provide convincing evidence to sup-
ort a classic Georgist hypothesis in the case of Cardiff Bus, that a
igniﬁcant part of the added local property values does come from
he land beneath them, or more speciﬁcally, from the land plots’
eographic adjacency to the bus stop locations. This ﬁnding jus-
iﬁes a potential policy intervention in terms of ﬁnancing Cardiff
us through a land value tax mechanism, given the substantiated
ositive externalities yielded by Cardiff Bus.
Second, the results of our quantile calibration entail some even
ore intriguing practical insights. We  ﬁnd that the positive exter-
alities of Cardiff Bus are distributed unevenly among properties
t different price levels in the local real estate market. Generally
peaking, according to Table 6, properties at the high end (at the 80%
nd 90% quantiles) of the market tend to beneﬁt more than those at
he low end (at the 10% and 20% quantiles). This implicates a neces-
ity to exercise progressive land value taxation, whereby properties
t different price levels need to be taxed at different rates, so that
he uneven distribution of positive externalities can be accordingly
aptured. Our estimation, based on the number of bus stops within
 1500 m radius of every individual property included in our sample
ata, suggests a tentative land value betterment tax rate of 0.11%
er new bus stop for the ﬁrst tier of properties which are priced
elow £195,000 and 0.22% for the second tier of properties which
re of higher market values.
We  notice a somewhat similar progressive taxation mechanism
lready incorporated in Cardiff’s existing council tax system, which
ivides local residential properties into nine different bands by
heir estimated values and applies incremental tax rates. There is
hus a possibility of introducing an embryonic land value tax ele-
ent into the current council tax scheme, depending on how we
ranslate the quantile hedonic approach featured in this study into
he council taxation system used in practice and also on whether a
arge enough dataset covering the entire Cardiff Council jurisdiction
ill become available in the near future.
Third, our overall empirical analysis deﬁes a conventional
isdom that public infrastructure always serves public interest.Arguably, the case of Cardiff Bus illustrates a free-ride scenario,
wherein the most wealthy property owners, intentionally or
unintentionally, end up extracting the values of publicly funded
transport infrastructures. A similar ﬁnding has also been made
recently by Banister and Thurstain-Goodwin (2011, pp. 216–221),
who suggest land value betterment created by the rail networks
to be even more extensive. In this sense, levying land value tax
is not only to capture economic externalities, but also to ensure
socioeconomic justice and fairness, as per the Edwardian tradition.
Conclusion and future research
In this paper, we explore the potential viability of levying land
value tax within a local UK context. We  focus on the empirical and
technical aspects by asking how to assess the spatialised relations
between the local public transport infrastructures and the land val-
ues of nearby residential properties. We answer this question by
studying the case of Cardiff Bus. Based on our multilevel and quan-
tile hedonic analysis, we ﬁnd strong evidence with regard to the
positive externalities of Cardiff Bus network towards the market
values of nearby residential properties. Given the uneven external-
ity distribution between properties at different price levels, we call
for a progressive land value tax scheme.
Because of the political context of our study, we consider action
research a key direction of our future research. We  would like
to take more opportunities to use our research to educate and
inform the general public about why  land value tax (LVT) is an
economically as well as socially desirable idea. Potential opposi-
tions to LVT are less likely from an efﬁciency perspective, since
most classic research has already conﬁrmed that purely taxing on
incomes from land would not distort resource allocation (Mills,
1981; Tideman, 1982; Wildasin, 1982). More recent research also
shows that it is actually easier than thought to implement neutral
or non-distortional land taxation (Arnott, 2005). Even with errors
in land valuation, the collection of LVT has been found to result
in no more distortions than the conventional property taxation
scheme (Chapman et al., 2009). Resistances to LVT are thus more
likely about the distributional effects of land taxation, or put simply,
regarding how to split the bills that fund public investments. Con-
troversial as this question is, we hope our current study and future
research on land value tax will help the voters make an informed
decision.The research reported in this paper is funded by the
British Academy/Leverlulme Small Research Grant initiative (ref:
SG122122). All errors lurking in the paper are the authors’.
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